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Abstract—The purpose of multi-source fusion is to combine
information from more than two evidence sources, or subjective
opinions from multiple actors. For subjective logic, a number
of different fusion operators have been proposed, each matching
a fusion scenario with different assumptions. However, not all
of these operators are associative, and therefore multi-source
fusion is not well-defined for these settings. In this paper,
we address this challenge, and define multi-source fusion for
weighted belief fusion (WBF) and consensus & compromise
fusion (CCF). For WBF, we show the definition to be equivalent
to the intuitive formulation under the bijective mapping between
subjective logic and Dirichlet evidence PDFs. For CCF, since
there is no independent generalization, we show that the resulting
multi-source fusion produces valid opinions, and explain why
our generalization is sound. For completeness, we also provide
corrections to previous results for averaging and cumulative
belief fusion (ABF and CBF), as well as belief constraint fusion
(BCF), which is an extension of Dempster’s rule. With our
generalizations of fusion operators, fusing information from
multiple sources is now well-defined for all different fusion types
defined in subjective logic. This enables wider applicability of
subjective logic in applications where multiple actors interact.
I. INTRODUCTION
Subjective logic is an extension of probabilistic logic that
enables the separate representation of belief and uncertainty.
The belief mass assignment and uncertainty are represented
in a subjective opinion ωAX held by an evidence source or
actor A on a random variable X . Similar to other extensions
introduced throughout the literature, such as Dempster-Shafer
Theory (DST) [1], [2], such extensions are widely used for
the purpose of data fusion. In data fusion, observations of
the same variable from multiple evidence sources are fused
by applying a fusion operator, such as Dempster’s rule of
combination in Dempster-Shafer Theory. Depending on the
specific application, an evidence source could be a sensor in
an autonomous vehicle, information in a court case, or an
expression of trust from two actors in a peer-to-peer system.
These different applications require fusion operators with
different properties, such as dependence between the evidence
seen by evidence sources. Subjective logic provides a wide
variety of these operators [3, Ch. 12], including averaging
belief fusion, cumulative belief fusion, weighted belief fusion,
consensus & compromise fusion and belief constraint fusion.
Each of these fusion operations is designed to determine the
shared belief and uncertainty of a group of evidence sources,
with different applications depending on how evidence should
be combined. For example, cumulative belief fusion can be
thought of as adding together the evidence for each potential
value of the variable X from all sources and representing this
as an opinion. In contrast, averaging belief fusion computes
the average of the evidence for each potential value. These
two fusion operations, along with weighted belief fusion, have
direct analogs in the Dirichlet model that considers evidence.
Not all of the operators defined for subjective logic are
associative, meaning that the fusion between more than two
evidence sources is in general not well-defined. However,
as pointed out by Jøsang [3, Ch. 12], the fusion operators
have semi-associative properties, which roughly means that
the individual steps of the fusion process are associative, but
at the end of this process, the result is normalized. Jøsang and
co-authors have since proposed multi-source formulations of
averaging and cumulative belief fusion in a previous work [4].
In this paper, we contribute further multi-source fusion for-
mulations for weighted belief fusion (WBF) and consensus &
compromise fusion (CCF). We also discuss a minor correction
to the corner cases of ABF and CBF by Jøsang et al. [4].
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the theoretical background of subjective opin-
ions and their relationship with Dirichlet PDFs. Section III
formulates multi-source variants of WBF and CCF. For WBF,
we prove that our formulation is equivalent to the confidence-
weighted averaging of the Dirichlet evidence PDFs. For CCF,
there is no direct equivalence: we only show that the multi-
source formulation is consistent, generates valid opinions,
and is conceptually correct. Section IV extends the example
from [4] with numerical results for the new operations and
potential applications. Section V concludes our work.
II. SUBJECTIVE OPINIONS
This section introduces the mathematical foundation of
subjective logic and the hyper-Dirichlet model, which is an
extension of the Dirichlet multinomial model. In addition,
we introduce the respective notation in both settings, provide
some intuition with regards to the interpretation, and describe a
bijective map between subjective logic and the hyper-Dirichlet
model.
A. Multinomial Opinions
Multinomial opinions [3, Ch 3.5] express belief bX(x) ∈
[0, 1] over the possible values x of a random variable X , as
well as an uncertainty uX and a base rate aX(x) ∈ [0, 1] for
every possible value. The conceptual purpose of multinomial
opinions is to describe the available evidence or belief in each
possible value x ∈ X in the domain of X. We first provide a
formal definition of multinomial opinions, before describing
their application and interpretation with an example.
Definition 1 (Multinomial Opinion). Let X ∈ X be a random
variable over the finite domain X. A multinomial opinion ωAX
held by A over X describes the subjective assignment of belief
by A to the outcome of X , consisting of an ordered triplet
ωAX = (b
A
X , u
A
X , a
A
X). Here, b
A
X : X → [0, 1] is the belief
mass distribution over X, uAX ∈ [0, 1] represents the lack of
evidence, and aAX : X → [0, 1] is the base rate distribution,
with the additivity requirements that 1 = uAX +
∑
x∈X b
A
X(x)
and
∑
x∈X a
A
X(x) = 1.
If the random variable X is the outcome of tossing a
potentially weighted die that uses colors instead of numbers,
then its domain X contains the possible color values (e.g., red,
green, blue, and so on). A multinomial opinion then assigns a
belief mass to each color. Initially, the uncertainty uX of this
distribution can be set to 1, which is referred to as a vacuous
opinion. The base rate of this opinion is the assumption that
the die is not weighted, i.e., that all outcomes are equally
likely: a(x) = 1/|X| = 1/6 for all x ∈ X. It is also possible
to have opinions that assign all the available mass to belief,
i.e., uX = 0, which is referred to as a dogmatic opinion. This
represents an edge case, since by definition zero uncertainty
means that there is absolute certainty in the belief distribution,
meaning the base rate has no bearing on the outcome at all.
To see how multinomial opinions can be applied, consider
the die example above. By using opinions as evidence accumu-
lators, each sampling of the random variable (i.e., throwing the
die and adjusting the belief) increases the available evidence
and thus the corresponding belief in the given outcome. The
expected outcome of our opinion projects the belief and
the uncertainty to a probability PX(x) by distributing the
uncertainty over the potential values in X according to the
base rate a(x). More formally [3, Ch. 3]:
PX(x) = bX(x) + aX(x) · uX
Multinomial opinions are often useful to represent evidence
from a set of different sources A, as common in trust man-
agement and data fusion. Referring again to the die example
above: if the observers have some kind of color blindness,
or the lighting conditions are sub-optimal, one can imagine
that different observers have different opinions about the
same observation. This is where multinomial opinions can be
used by these observers to agree on the outcome of specific
observations, as well as estimation of the real properties of the
die (by observing repeated experiments). These operations can
be achieved with fusion operations, as described in Section
III. One challenge for multinomial opinions is that it is not
possible to represent an observer that cannot distinguish two
colors in the above example (e.g., red-green color blindness),
other than assigning the same amount of evidence to both
values. However, this assignment implies that the relative
frequency of red and green is the same, while in fact what
we want to represent is the inability to distinguish between
these variables. This is where hyper-opinions are useful.
B. Hyper Opinions
Hyper opinions [3, Ch. 3.6] are the natural extension of
multinomial opinions, which allow belief assignment to com-
posite values. For example, taking x1, x2, x3 ∈ X, a multino-
mial opinion can assign a belief b(x1) = 0.1, b(x2) = 0.3,
b(x3) = 0.4, indicating the relative evidence between these
three possible values. Some situations require the assignment
of belief to composite values, e.g., b(x1 ∪ x2) = 0.4, stating
that there is evidence for either x1 or x2, without specify-
ing the relative evidence between them. This is exactly the
example we gave above with red-green color blindness, with
x1 = red and x2 = green. Another such example was given
by Hankin [5] in the context of Dirichlet hyper-PDFs, who
uses the example of relative strengths of tennis players in a
tournament. In their example, the outcome X = xi means
i wins a tournament, and the belief assignment distributes
the available evidence over the players. Assigning belief to
x1∪x2 represents evidence that player 1 or 2 will win, but does
not make statements about the relative probabilities between
player 1 and 2.
The formal description of a hyper opinion is then:
Definition 2 (Hyper Opinion). Let X ∈ X be a random
variable over the finite domain X, with the power set P(X) and
the reduced power set R(X) = P(X)\{X, ∅}. A hyper opinion
ωAX held by A over X describes the subjective assignment of
belief by A to the outcome of X , consisting of an ordered
triplet ωAX = (b
A
X , u
A
X , a
A
X). Here, b
A
X : R(X) → [0, 1] is the
belief mass distribution over R(X), uAX ∈ [0, 1] represents
the lack of evidence, and aAX : X → [0, 1] is the base
rate distribution over X, with the additivity requirements that
1 = uAX +
∑
x∈R(X) b
A
X(x) and
∑
x∈R(X) a
A
X(x) = 1.
Remark 1 (Base rate over singleton values). Note that the
base rate distribution is still over X here, meaning that X
takes values from X, not from P(X), and thus a hyper opinion
has (2k + k − 3) degrees of freedom for a domain X of
cardinality k, as discussed in [3, Ch. 3, p. 40].
C. Dirichlet Distributions
Both multinomial and hyper opinions are directly related
to Dirichlet distributions. The traditional Dirichlet distribution
is defined by a vector of k parameters, αX , resulting in
the notation Dir(pX , αX). This model has wide statistical
applications; for our purposes, it will ground interpretations
of opinions in a statistical sense. The probability density
function (PDF) of a Dirichlet distribution can be adapted to an
evidence-based formulation by setting the vector of parameters
to represent the evidence for the possible outcomes of X . This
is done by selecting a non-informative prior weight W and
configuring the strength parameters αX to be rX + aXW ,
where rX(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X. The PDF is then denoted


bAX(x) =
r
A
X
(x)
W+
∑
x∈R(X)
rA
X
(x)
uAX =
W
W+
∑
x∈R(X)
rA
X
(x)

 1-to-1←→


For uAX 6= 0: r
A
X(x) =
WbA
X
(x)
uA
X
1 = uAX +
∑
x∈R(X)
bAX(x)
For uAX = 0: r
A
X(x) = b
A
X(x) · ∞
1 =
∑
x∈R(X)
bAX(x)


Fig. 1. Bijection between hyper opinions (left) and Dirichlet HPDFs (right), as defined in [3].
DireX(pX , rX , aX), where rX is termed the evidence vector
and aX is the base rate distribution. The non-informative prior
weight is set to W = 2, resulting in a uniform base rate
distribution, as discussed in previous work [3], [4]. The PDF
is then written as (compare [3, Ch. 3, p. 32-33]):
DireX(pX , rX , aX) =
Γ
(∑
x∈X(rX(x) + aX(x)W )
)∏
x∈X Γ(rX(x) + aX(x)W )
·∏
x∈X
pX(x)
rX (x)+aX(x)W−1 (1)
where rX(x) + aX(x)W ≥ 0 and pX(x) 6= 0 if rX(x) +
aX(x)W < 1.
This is the multinomial Dirichlet model, as also discussed
in [4]. Hankin [5] formulated an extension of this model that
allows evidence to be assigned to composite values, similar to
hyper opinions, referred to as Dirichlet hyper-PDFs. Jøsang [3,
Sec. 3.6.3] defines the evidence-based formulation of those
hyper-PDFs, summarized as follows (where the superscript H
indicates the hyper probability distribution is concerned):
DireHX (p
H
X , rX , aX) =
Γ
(∑
x∈R(X)(rX(x) + aX(x)W )
)
∏
x∈R(X) Γ(rX(x) + aX(x)W )
·
∏
x∈R(X)
pHX(x)
rX (x)+aX(x)W−1 (2)
where rX(x) + aX(x)W ≥ 0 and pHX(x) 6= 0 if rX(x) +
aX(x)W < 1.
Jøsang [3, Sec. 3.6.5] also describes the relationship be-
tween the PDF of the hyper probability distribution pHX and
the probability distribution pX : we refer interested readers
to this work for a detailed discussion of the interpretative
differences between these cases. For this work, it suffices that
there is a well-defined grounding of both multinomial and
hyper opinions in the Dirichlet multinomial model and the
Dirichlet hyper-PDF model, respectively.
D. Mapping Opinions to Dirichlet (H)PDFs
We now introduce the relation between opinions and Dirich-
let (H)PDFs. There is a bijective map between Dirichlet
HPDFs of the form Dir
eH,A
X (p
H
X , r
A
X , a
A
X) and hyper opinions
ωAX = (b
A
X , u
A
X , a
A
X), as shown in Figure 1 (compare [3,
Def. 3.9]). A similar map can be defined between multinomial
opinions and Dirichlet PDFs, where the range of the mapping
is constrained to x ∈ X instead of x ∈ R(X). Equivalently,
for multinomial opinions and Dirichlet PDFs, the bijective map
in Figure 1 applies where r and b for all composite values is
defined as 0.
For both the multinomial and the hyper opinion setting,
there is an important edge case in this bijective map when
the uncertainty is 0. As previously discussed, this semantically
means that the belief distribution is “known”, which implies
there is infinite evidence. We briefly discuss the intuition
behind this concept, as it is essential for the corresponding
edge cases in the fusion operations, both in previous work [4]
and in our formulations below. This is equivalent to taking the
limit limuA
X
→0 of the case for u
A
X 6= 0, giving the expression
in Figure 1. To distinguish between different evidence vari-
ables’ frequencies, the notion of relative degrees of infinity is
used [6]. This intuitively corresponds to the relative likelihood
of the different values for the variable X . For a detailed
discussion of these conceptual notions, we refer interested
readers to earlier work by Jøsang et al. [6, Sec. 4].
III. MULTI-SOURCE FUSION
Multi-source fusion refers to the combination of opinions
from multiple sources. Intuitively, this can be understood as
a set of actors A coming together to agree on a common
conclusion (ω◦AX ), using some fusion operator ◦. This operator
specifies precisely how to combine the information represented
by each actor’s subjective opinion. For operators that are both
commutative and associative, ωA1X ◦ ω
A2
X ◦ ω
A3
X . . . is well-
defined, and therefore fusion is straight-forward. However, the
fusion operators defined as binary operators in [3, Ch. 12]
are not all associative, i.e., in general, ωA1X ◦ (ω
A2
X ◦ ω
A3
X ) 6=
(ωA1X ◦ ω
A2
X ) ◦ ω
A3
X , motivating the need to generalize the
operators to accept arrays of opinions that are merged through
fusion. This section defines multi-source fusion operations to
generalize the operators not discussed in [4].
A. Cumulative and Averaging Belief Fusion
In previous work, the authors [4] propose multi-source fu-
sion for the CBF and ABF operators. The definitions provided
by the authors for CBF (Equations 16-19) and ABF (Equations
32-35) require some adjustments: the cases defined in the
original paper are incorrect and lead to division by zero.
Division by zero occurs when at least one opinion has a non-
zero uncertainty, while at least two (other) opinions have zero
uncertainty: this leads to Case I in the original formulation, but
in the corresponding equations, all the products in the divisions
for b and u are zero. Therefore, a straight-forward correction
is to require that all uncertainties to be zero whenever applying
Case I. One should then also modify the condition for Case
II accordingly, and additionally modify the equations such
that any non-dogmatic opinions are discarded. This makes
sense intuitively, since any non-dogmatic opinion represents
finite evidence in the Dirichlet evidence PDF representation
(through the bijective map of Figure 1), while a dogmatic opin-
ion represents infinite evidence. Therefore, Case II discards
finite evidence and combines the dogmatic opinions only. The
original authors have since published a revised version of the
paper on-line 1.
1) Epistemic Cumulative Belief Fusion: Although it was
not explicitly discussed in [4], a multi-source variant of
epistemic cumulative belief fusion can also be derived from
the aleatory form discussed above. The difference between
aleatory and epistemic fusion is the type of knowledge rep-
resented by the opinion; the aleatory variant describes the
fusion of information with respect to specific observations,
while the epistemic variant describes the fusion of knowledge.
For epistemic cumulative belief fusion (e-CBF) of multiple
opinions (as opposed to aleatory CBF), the only reasonable
approach is then to first apply the multi-source aleatory
cumulative fusion described in [4], until all relevant epistemic
knowledge has been cumulated. Only when a decision needs
to be made should uncertainty maximization (as discussed
in [3, Ch. 12]) be applied to the resulting opinion. To see
why this is reasonable, consider that e-CBF is used in an on-
line fashion, fusing two opinions together before fusing them
with a third. Fusing an e-CBF result with epistemic knowledge
from a third source skews results in favor of this third source,
since the uncertainty controls how much of the belief mass of
the new epistemic evidence is considered for the final result.
Instead, one would normally expect that the three opinions are
considered equally in the fusion process. Similarly, in practice,
an analyst would first combine all the available knowledge
(i.e., retrieve all relevant epistemic evidence from all sources),
and only then make a decision – if more information becomes
available later on, one would expect the analyst to re-do the
computation, rather than fuse the uncertainty-maximized result
with the new information. Thus, indeed, e-CBF should be
performed by applying a-CBF to all opinions, and then the
result should be uncertainty-maximized.
B. Belief Constraint Fusion
Belief constraint fusion (BCF) is the extension of Demp-
ster’s rule of combination to hyper opinions. Although Demp-
ster’s rule of combination is associative, this rule does not
consider the base rate, as Dempster-Shafer Theory does not
foresee such base rate distinctions. If the base rate is not the
same for all inputs, the operator defined by Jøsang [3, Ch.
12.2] is not associative, as pointed out by the author: we thus
require a multi-source formulation of this operation.
1https://folk.uio.no/josang/papers/JWZ2017-FUSION.pdf
Definition 3 (BCF of opinions for multiple sources). Let A
be a finite set of actors and let ωAX = (b
A
X , u
A
X , a
A
X) denote
the multinomial opinion held by A ∈ A over X . We define
the belief constraint fusion of these opinions as the opinion
ω&AX = (b
&A
X , u
&A
X , a
&A
X ) where
b&AX (x) = m
⊕A(x)
u&AX = m
⊕A(X)
a&AX (x) =


∑
A∈A
a
A
X
(x)(1−uAX)
∑
A∈A
(1−uAX)
, for
∑
A∈A
uAX < |A|
∑
A∈A
a
A
X
(x)
|A| , otherwise
Here, the belief mass is merged through Dempster’s rule of
combination [1, Ch. 3.1]:
m⊕A(x) = (m1 ⊕m2 ⊕ . . .⊕m|A|)(x) (3)
where
(mi ⊕mj)(∅) = 0
(mi ⊕mj)(x) =
∑
y∩z=x
mi(y)mj(z)
1−Ki,j
, for x 6= ∅
and
Ki,j =
∑
y∩z=∅
mi(y)mj(z)
This definition essentially corresponds to the application
of a map between the individual opinions to DST, applying
Dempster’s rule, and mapping back again. Although it is
obvious that this is well-defined for the belief and uncertainty
(since the translation is one-to-one [3, Ch. 5]), the base rate
needs separate consideration. The special case where all the
base rates are the same, as implicitly assumed by DST (i.e.,
that aX(x) = 1/|X|), also holds trivially. However, subjective
logic technically allows for different base rates: these are
combined as a confidence-weighted average (first case in the
definition above), as defined by Jøsang [3, Ch. 12]. This
only works if there is at least one non-vacuous opinion (i.e.,
∃x ∈ X, A ∈ A : bAX(x) 6= 0): if all confidences are zero, the
confidence is equal for all opinions, and therefore the most
meaningful combination of potentially distinct base rates is
computing their average. Note that both cases preserve the
standard setting, where base rates are equal across all opinions
(including the output).
C. Weighted Belief Fusion
Audun Jøsang defined the weighted belief fusion of two
opinions in [3, Def. 12.8, p. 232], which we extend here to a
multi-source variant as follows:
Definition 4 (WBF of opinions for multiple sources). Let A
be a finite set of actors and let ωAX = (b
A
X , u
A
X , a
A
X) denote the
multinomial opinion held by A ∈ A over X . Then we define
the weighted belief fusion of these opinions as the opinion
ω⋄̂AX = (b
⋄̂A
X , u
⋄̂A
X , a
⋄̂A
X ) as follows:
Case 1: (∀A ∈ A : uAX 6= 0) ∧ (∃A ∈ A : u
A
X 6= 1)
b⋄̂AX (x) =
∑
A∈A
bAX(x)
(
1− uAX
) ∏
A′∈A,A′ 6=A
uA
′
X( ∑
A∈A
∏
A′ 6=A
uAX
)
− |A| ·
∏
A∈A
uAX
u⋄̂AX =
(
|A| −
∑
A∈A
uAX
)
·
∏
A∈A
uAX( ∑
A∈A
∏
A′ 6=A
uAX
)
− |A| ·
∏
A∈A
uAX
a⋄̂AX (x) =
∑
A∈A
aAX(x)
(
1− uAX
)
|A| −
∑
A∈A
uAX
Case 2: ∃A ∈ A : uAX = 0. Let A
dog = {A ∈ A : uAX = 0},
i.e., Adog is the set of all dogmatic opinions in the input.
b⋄̂AX (x) =
∑
A∈Adog
γAXb
A
X(x)
u⋄̂AX = 0
a⋄̂AX (x) =
∑
A∈Adog
γAXa
A
X(x)
where γAX = lim
u⋄̂A
X
→0
uAX∑
A′∈Adog
uA
′
X
Note that γAX is defined by this limit due to the bijective
map (analogous to [3, Ch. 12] and [4]).
Case 3: ∀A ∈ A : uAX = 1
b⋄̂AX (x) = 0
u⋄̂AX = 1
a⋄̂AX (x) =
∑
A∈A
aAX(x)
|A|
Remark 2 (Infinite evidence). In Definition 4, case 2 de-
scribes the resulting combined belief using the relative weight
γAX per actor with infinite evidence. This is analogous to the
notion of relative infinities in the bijective map discussed in
Section II-D. We exclude all finite evidence parameters here,
by only considering the actors with dogmatic opinions: all
non-dogmatic actors will have finite (and therefore negligible)
evidence.
Remark 3 (No evidence). If no evidence is available (Defini-
tion 4, case 3) in any of the inputs, this operation would divide
by zero (since uAX = 1 for all actors, making the nominator
0 in case 1). However, if no evidence is available, the fused
opinion should obviously also have no evidence: this justifies
the definition in case 3.
We remark that confidence-weighted combination of base
rates as defined in Definition 4 maintains the intuitive property
that if all base rates of inputs are equal, the output has the
same base rate, regardless of the case. Intuitively, since the
base rate represents the belief in absence of information, this
should always be the case, but the theory allows actors to have
different base rates, in which case they are averaged.
This derivation should intuitively correspond to that derived
from the Dirichlet HPDF, as shown in [3, Thm. 12.4] for two
opinions. In short, this theorem derives that the weighted belief
fusion operator for two opinions is equivalent to confidence-
weighted averaging of the evidence parameters of the two
corresponding Dirichlet HPDFs. We should thus show that our
definition corresponds to the confidence-weighted averaging of
the evidence parameters of all opinions. This is defined as:
DireHX (p
H
X , r
⋄̂A
X , a
⋄̂A
X ),where (4)
r⋄̂AX (x) =
∑
A∈A r
A
X(x) · (1− u
A
X)∑
A∈A(1− u
A
X)
Theorem 1. Our definition of weighted belief fusion of opin-
ions for multiple sources is compatible with weighted belief
fusion of Dirichlet HPDFs.
Proof. We want to show that the WBF of multiple Dirichlet
HPDFs corresponding to subjective opinions, when mapped
back to a subjective opinion yield the formulas in Definition 4.
We show only the derivation of u⋄̂AX , where u
A
X 6= 0 for all
A ∈ A. The other derivations follow the same basic pattern
and do not provide any additional insights.
Using the mapping between Dirichlet HPDFs and hyper
opinions from Figure 1 we compute the evidence of multiple
fused HPDFs corresponding to hyper opinions as follows.
r⋄̂AX (x) =
∑
A∈A
rAX(x) · (1 − u
A
X)∑
A∈A
(1− uAX)
(5)
=
∑
A∈A
(
bA(x)(1 − uAX) ·
∏
A′ 6=A
uAX
)
∑
A∈A
(1− uAX)
∏
A∈A
uAX
Again, using the mapping in Figure 1 we know that the
uncertainty of the fused HPDFs is
u⋄̂AX =
W
W +
∑
x∈R(X)
r⋄̂AX (x)
Plugging in r⋄̂AX (x) we can cancel W and receive
u⋄̂AX =
(∑
A∈A
(1− uAX)
∏
A∈A
uAX
)
·
(∑
A∈A
(1 − uAX)
∏
A∈A
uAX+
∑
x∈R(X)
∑
A∈A
bA(x)(1 − uAX)
∏
A′ 6=A
uA
′
X


−1
Next, we can substitute
∑
x∈R(X) b
A
X(x) by 1− u
A
X .
A tedious but not difficult computation yields the result.
D. CC Fusion
CC fusion (CCF) is conceptually designed to first achieve
consensus, conserving the agreed weight of all inputs, and
then compute a weighted compromise for the remaining belief
mass based on the relative uncertainty and the corresponding
base rates relative to intersecting sets. Because this second
step generally results in a total distribution greater than 1,
a normalization factor η is used, which is multiplied with
the compromise belief to compute the final fused result. Let
again A be a finite set of actors and let ωAX = (b
A
X , u
A
X , aX)
denote the multinomial opinion held by A ∈ A over X .
Then, CC fusion ω⋐AX is defined as the result of the following
three computation phases: 1) consensus phase, 2) compromise
phase, 3) normalization phase.
Step 1: Consensus Phase
In the first phase, the consensus belief bconsX (x) is computed as
a minimum common belief per x. The residual beliefs bresAX (x)
of each actor are the differences between their belief and the
consensus belief. The total consensus bconsX is the sum of all
consensus beliefs.
bconsX (x) = min
A∈A
bAX(x) (6)
bresAX (x) = b
A
X(x) − b
cons
X (x), for each A ∈ A
bconsX =
∑
x∈R(X)
bconsX (x)
Step 2: Compromise Phase
The compromise belief b
comp
X (x) in a frame x is computed by
adding four components: 1) the residue belief, weighted by
all other actors’ uncertainty, 2) the common belief in frame
sets where the intersection is x, 3) the common belief in sets
where the union is x, but whose intersection is non-empty, and
4) the common belief in the sets where the union is x and the
intersection is empty. This can be formulated as follows:
b
comp
X (x) =
∑
A∈A
bresAX (x) ·
∏
A′∈A,A′ 6=A
uA
′
X
+
∑
y1,...,y|A|
s.t. ∩iyi=x
|A|∏
i=1
b
resAi
X (yi) · aX(yi | yj, j 6= i)
+
∑
y1,...,y|A|
s.t. ∪iyi=x
and ∩iyi 6=∅



1− |A|∏
i=1
aX(yi | yj, j 6= i)

 · |A|∏
i=1
b
resAi
X (yi)


+
∑
y1,...,y|A|
s.t. ∪iyi=x
and ∩iyi=∅
|A|∏
i=1
b
resAi
X (yi) where x ∈ P(X) (7)
The second, third and forth terms of this equation taken
together basically iterate over a tabulation of the different valid
combinations for yi ∈ P(X), and depending on the constraints
defined under the sum, one of the three computations is made.
Since set operations are associative and commutative, the
ordering of A implied by this equation is irrelevant, since all
orderings are included in the tabulation. This is analogous to
the way this operator was initially defined by Jøsang [3].
Additionally, in the second phase the preliminary uncer-
tainty mass upreX is computed as the product of all uncertainties.
The intuition is that this represents the common uncertainty
all actors agree on. The value b
comp
X is computed as sum of the
compromise beliefs over P(X):
upreX =
∏
A∈A
uAX (8)
bcompX =
∑
x∈P(X)
b
comp
X (x) (9)
These values are used in the next phase.
Step 3: Normalization Phase
Since mostly bconsX + b
comp
X + u
pre
X < 1, a normalization factor
η of bcompX has to be applied. We compute η as follows.
η =
1− bconsX − u
pre
X
bcompX
(10)
The belief on the entire domain X is then added to the
uncertainty. The intuition behind this is that a belief in X is
the belief that anything will happen. Referring back to the
tournament example from Hankin, the belief that X will win is
the belief that a winner exists, without distinguishing between
the singleton values in this set, which is equivalent to non-
informative belief, i.e., uncertainty.
u⋐AX = u
pre
X + ηb
comp
X (X). (11)
After this transfer, we set b
comp
X (X) = 0.
Now, the belief can be combined over all x ∈ R(X) after
applying the normalization factor.
b⋐AX (x) = b
cons
X (x) + ηb
comp
X (x). (12)
Definition 5 (CC-Fusion of multiple sources). Given a fi-
nite set of actors A and their multinomial opinions ωAX =
(bAX , u
A
X , aX) over X for A ∈ A. We define the resulting
CC-fused opinion as a result of the previous three-step com-
putation as ω⋐AX = (b
⋐A
X , u
⋐A
X , aX).
As this fusion operation is defined for subjective logic only,
we do not prove it’s equivalence to other operations in other
models. However, we note that this operation always generates
valid opinions, and that our definition reduces to the original
definition for the case that |A| = 2.
Remark 4 (Multi-source CCF always generates valid opin-
ions). This holds if the output of multi-source CCF produces
valid beliefs and uncertainties (in the range of [0, 1]), and the
additive property holds, i.e.,
∑
x∈P(X) bX(x) = 1. The first
property holds, since the definition consists only of additions
and multiplications of non-negative numbers, except for the
definition bresAX (x) = b
A
X(x)− b
cons
X (x), which is at least zero,
since the latter term is the minimum of all the beliefs in x.
The second property holds due to the choice of η, and because
bAX(∅) = 0 for well-defined belief functions:
1
!
= u⋐AX +
∑
x∈R(X)
b⋐AX
= upreX + ηb
comp
X (X) +
∑
x∈R(X)
(bconsX (x) + ηb
comp
X (x))
= upreX + b
cons
X + ηb
comp
X
= upreX + b
cons
X + 1− b
cons
X − u
pre
X = 1
Remark 5 (Multi-source CCF is a generalization of the CC
fusion operator). With A = {A,B}, the steps resolve to these
statements are as follows:
bconsX (x) = min(b
A
X(x),b
B
X(x)) (13)
bresAX (x) = b
A
X(x)− b
cons
X (x) (14)
bresBX (x) = b
B
X(x)− b
cons
X (x) (15)
bconsX =
∑
x∈R(X)
bconsX (x) (16)
b
comp
X (x) = b
resA
X (x)u
B
X + b
resB
X (x)u
A
X
+
∑
y1,y2
s.t. y1∩y2=x
bresAX (y1)aX(y1|y2)aX(y2|y1)
+
∑
y1,y2
s.t. y1∪y2=x
and y1∩y2 6=∅
(1− aX(y1|y2)aX(y2|y1))b
resA
X (y1)b
resB
X (y2)
+
∑
y1,y2
s.t. y1∪y2=x
and y1∩y2 6=∅
bresAX (y1)b
resB
X (y2) (17)
upreX = u
A
Xu
B
X (18)
bcompX =
∑
x∈P(X)
b
comp
X (x) (19)
η =
1− bconsX − u
pre
X
bcompX
(20)
u⋐AX = u
pre
X + ηb
comp
X (X) (21)
and finally, setting bcomp(X) = 0.
Except for differences in notation, this is the same as the
definitions provided in [3, Ch. 12].
IV. EXAMPLE
In this section, we extend the table from Jøsang et al. [4]
with results for the fusion operations we have defined. This
example considers a situation where three sources, A =
{A1, A2, A3}, provide opinions over the same binary domain
X = {x, x¯}. These opinions can be merged using the operators
we discussed in this paper: the numerical results are shown in
Table I. An existing open-source implementation for binomial
opinions was extended with these operations2. We briefly
discuss the functionality of each new operation (highlighted
in bold in the table).
• epistemic Cumulative Belief Fusion (eCBF) is the
uncertainty-maximized version of aCBF. As previously
mentioned, epistemic here refers to the fact that the
opinions involved are used for representing knowledge,
rather than documenting specific observations. Epistemic
opinions are always uncertainty maximized: they repre-
sent exactly the available information about X beyond
the base rate a, and no more. This operation is useful for
artificial reasoning about abstract events, which are not
tied to a specific instance.
• Belief Constraint Fusion (BCF) is the generalization of
Dempster’s rule of combination that considers distinct
base rates. The interpretation of BCF has been the subject
of many works over the years [3], [7], [8], most impor-
tantly noting that conflict is essentially discarded.
• Weighted Belief Fusion (WBF) is the evidence-weighted
combination of belief from different sources. Similar to
averaging belief fusion, it is useful where dependence
between these sources is assumed. However, it intro-
duces additional weighting, increasing the significance
of sources that possess high certainty. This automatic
weighting is useful for the combination of evidence
from a large variety of uncertain sources which output
high certainty in very specific scenarios. In such cases,
ABF issues high uncertainty, while WBF outputs what is
intuitively a consensus between experts: each expert indi-
vidually chooses their confidence, and thus their weight
in the decision.
2https://github.com/vs-uulm/subjective-logic-java
TABLE I
EXTENDING THE EXAMPLES FROM [4]. THE NUMBERS PRESENTED HERE ARE ROUNDED. THE FINAL ROW OF THE TABLE PRESENTS THE PROJECTION OF
EACH OPERATION TO THE PROBABILISTIC SPACE.
Inputs Fusion
Parameters A1 A2 A3 aCBF eCBF BCF ABF WBF CCF
b(x) 0.10 0.40 0.70 0.651 0.442 0.738 0.509 0.562 0.629
b(x¯) 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.209 0 0.184 0.164 0.146 0.182
u 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.140 0.558 0.078 0.327 0.292 0.189
a(x) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
P (x) 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.721 0.721 0.777 0.673 0.708 0.723
• Consensus & Compromise Fusion (CCF) is specifically
designed to create vague belief from conflicting belief
on singleton values. More precisely, generating a vague
belief refers to the derivation of a belief of a composite
value x1 ∩ x2 if two opinions have high belief in x1
and x2 respectively. This is useful when different experts
generate opinions identifying different options, such as
when doctors with different expertise suggest potential
causes in a diagnostic process. The fused opinion reflects
the opinion of all experts, and illustrates the group as a
whole is certain about a certain set of potential causes,
without expressing relative likelihood.
Potential applications of these operations include their use
for multi-source fusion between entities. In our previous work,
we have proposed the use of subjective logic for a misbehavior
detection framework [9], which we have since implemented.
For our analysis, multi-source fusion with subjective logic was
required; in our future work, we intend to adopt the results
presented here into this framework.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have introduced multi-source fusion
operations for several existing fusion operators: the belief
constraint fusion, the weighted belief fusion, and the consensus
& compromise fusion. Since the native operators’ definitions
are non-associative, they require a definition to enable fusion
of information from multiple sources. We also discuss the
intuition behind the fusion process and the corresponding
interpretation of the fusion result. Finally, we have proven
that WBF corresponds to the confidence-weighted averaging
of evidence in the Dirichlet multinomial model.
In our future work, we aim to implement and apply these
new multi-source fusion operations in our work, which is cen-
tered around attack detection through the fusion of information
from different sources. We currently foresee a combination of
fusion operations with trust discounting and trust revision to
update trust in various sources. We intend to apply both WBF
and CCF for this fusion process, but for different source types.
Finally, we would like to comment that both Dempster-
Shafer Theory [7], [10] and Subjective Logic [11] have been
the subject of controversy over the years. The entirety of our
work relies on the recently published book discussing subjec-
tive logic [3], which contains a clear map between subjective
opinions and Dirichlet PDFs, resolving the main issue raised
by Dezert et al. [11] (namely that different mappings have
been proposed, and it is unclear which is the valid one).
Nevertheless, the criticisms and alternative proposals made by
these and other authors should be considered seriously. To our
best understanding, the concerns raised have been resolved suf-
ficiently, which is also evidenced by the continued study and
extension of subjective logic at major publication platforms
in the field [4]. We argue that our proposed derivations of
multi-source fusion operations is a useful contribution to the
field.
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